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ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF 
PROBATIONERS: A STEP TOWARD BIG 
BROTHER? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thirty-six years ago George Orwell penned his novel, 1984, 
in which he told of one man's struggle against a totalitarian 
state which used technology to deprive its citizens of privacy in 
order to control them. The year 1984 has arrived and many of 
Orwell's scenarios have come to pass. The development of elec-
tronic surveillance methods in recent decades has done much to 
change traditional concepts· of privacy and fourth amendment 
guarantees, particularly in the area of criminal law. Uses of such 
technology have been applied by law enforcement officers in 
many facets of criminal investigation. Such uses have run the 
gamut from bugs in telephone boothsl and pen registers2 to 
beeper tracking devices.3 Electronic monitoring of prison in-
mates has often been viewed as constitutionally permissible and 
an effective way of maintaining prison security.· 
Recently, high technology has found an application in the 
area of probation.6 Although the probation technology does not 
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (fourth amendment protects against 
warrantless searches conducted via bugging devices). 
2. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (the constitution has been interpreted to 
permit the government to order the telephone company to place a pen register on a 
customer's phone lines 80 that a list of all telephone numbers dialed may be obtained 
without a warrant). 
3. United States v. Knotts.--U.S_,103 S.Ct. 1081 (1983). The Court held that 
monitoring the signal of a beeper placed in a container of chemicals that were being 
transported to the owner's cabin did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on 
the cabin owner's part. 
4. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 
(1978); C.f., DeLancie v. Superior court, 31 Cal. 3d 865, 647 P.2d 142, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866 
(1982). 
5. One court in New Mexico has recently instituted a program where probationers 
wear a monitoring device to enforce home curfew. Seattle Times/P03t Intelligencer, June 
26, 1983, at A4, Col. 1. 
Lake County, Illinois had also begun using a similar device in its probation program. 
ABA J., Oct. 1983, at 1352. This program, however, will not be discussed in this 
comment. 
431 
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parallel the intrusiveness of some of the previously mentioned 
electronic surveillance techniques, such an application of high 
technology may lead to greater intrusions on not only the pri-
vacy of persons convicted of crimes, but on society in general. 
This comment will discuss an existing probationer surveillance 
program in New Mexico, an analysis of electronic surveillance 
under the fourth amendment, post-conviction rights, and 
whether or not such a monitoring program is a valid condition of 
probation under federal and state statues. 
II. THE NEW MEXICO PROGRAM 
In lieu of a prison or jail sentence, Judge Jack Love of Divi-
sion III of the Second Judicial District of New Mexico imple-
mented a pilot project to electronically monitor persons con-
victed of drunk driving or white collar crime when such persons 
agree to participate in the program as a condition of probation.s 
The New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the program and gave 
the judge its approval to continue the program so long as the 
privacy and dignity of the individuals and their families was 
protected.7 Under the New Mexico program, the first proba-
tioner was sentenced to wear an electronic monitoring device 
while under home curfew.8 The device, manufactured by the Na-
tional Incarceration Monitor and Control Services (NIMCOS), 
monitors the presence· or absence of probationers at any given 
time or location.9 
The GOSSlink system operates via a transmitter which is 
strapped to the ankle of the person convicted and sentenced to 
home curfew or house arrest as an alternative to imprisonment. to 
A receiver is placed in the probationer's home which detects the 
. presence or absence of the transmitter signal. When the micro-
processor attached to the receiver detects a change in status, i.e., 
acquisition or loss of the signal, it calls a centrally located com-
puter via the probationer's telephone.ll The receiver will lose 
6.Id. 
7.Id. 
8. NIMCOS, The National Incarceration Monitor and Control Services, Inc. report 
on its GOSSlink probationer monitoring device, at 2. 
9.Id. 
10.Id. 
U.Id. 
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the signal at approximately one hundred and fifty feet. The cen-
tral computer at the probation office records the arrival or de-
parture times of the probationer and instructs the micro-proces-
sor to call the probationer's home at randomly selected times to 
ensure that the probationer has not circumvented the system. Ii 
The device is worn during the entire term of the probation pe-
riod. The NIMCOS system has sensors which can detect 
whether its wearer has attempted to tamper with or remove the 
Gosslink. The probation department receives a printed report 
from the computer each morning detailing the probationer's ar-
rivals, departures and any attempts at circumventing the 
system. 18 
Since the central computer at the probation department is 
able to note attempts to tamper with the system or times when 
the probationer failed to obey the home curfew terms of his or 
her probation, the probation department can take appropriate 
action.14 Such an "early warning" system could save probation 
resources and improve the self-image of the probationer by lim-
iting unnecessary home visits by probation officers. 111 
The current basic cost of the NIMCOS system is 
$100,000.00 per year. 111 The basic fee includes the cost of twenty-
five monitoring units. Additional units may be obtained at a per 
unit cost of $1,000.00 per year. Judge Love and the authors of 
the NIMCOS literature believe that the system could save gov-
ernment money by providing an alternative to incarceration for 
less dangerous individuals.l'I' Although the GOSSlink system 
may be a money-saving alternative to jail or prison, it remains to 
be seen whether such devices are constitutional or valid condi-
tions of probation. 18 
12. [d. at 1-2. 
13. [d. at 2. 
14. [d. 
15. Kleinman, Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: A Critical Look at Home Visits by 
Parole Officers, 14 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 355, 375 {1982-83}. 
Kleinman states that parolees may suffer a lower self-image and, as a result, have a 
more difficult time rehabilitating themselves, because of parole surveillance. Since parol-
ees are in a position similar to that of probationers, it is arguable that probationers may 
also have reduced self-image because of constant surveillance during their term of 
probation. 
16. NIMCOS, supra note 5. 
17. [d. at 4. 
18. Seattle Times/Post Intelligencer, June 26, 1983, at A4, col. 1. 
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III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY 
Courts analyzing uses of high technology have been forced 
to rethink many of their traditional notions of privacy. Origi-
nally, the fourth amendment was drafted to protect citizens 
from physical government intrusions into their homes.19 Re-
cently, courts have been faced with the dilemma of analyzing 
non-physical electronic intrusions by government officials under 
the Fourth Amendment. Much of the recent analysis of elec-
tronic surveillance has taken place in the context of pre-convic- . 
tion investigatory uses by law enforcement agencies. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States20 
marked a change in traditional fourth amendment analysis away 
from a theory based on property concepts to one grounded in 
notions of personal privacy. The Katz court recognized that sur-
veillance, via an electronic bug placed on a public telephone 
booth, could constitute a search by the government, even though 
it did not constitute a "physical" invasion.21 
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz announced a 
two-prong standard for determining whether a search had taken 
place for purposes of fourth amendment analysis. Harlan's ap-
19. Warren & Brandis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 1983-220 (1980). 
20. Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
21. C.f., Lanza v. New Vork, 370 U.S. 139 (1962). In Lanza, the Supreme Court 
addressed a fourth amendment challenge to electronic interception of a conversation be-
tween a jail prisoner and visitor. The court concluded: 
[T]o say that a public jail is the equivalent of a man's "house" 
or that it is a place where he can claim constitutional immu-
nity from search or seizure of his person, his papers, or his 
effects, is at best a novel argument. To be sure, the Court has 
been far from niggardly in construing the physical scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection. A business office is a protected 
area, and so may be a store. A hotel room, in the eyes of the 
Fourth Amendment, may become a person's "house," and so, 
of course, may an apartment . . . Vet, without attempting ei-
ther to define or to predict the ultimate scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection, it is obvious that a jail shares none of 
the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, 
or a hotel room. In prison, official surveillance has tradition-
ally been the order of the day. 
Id. at 143 (emphasis added). 
Although Katz appears to have overruled the "protected area" analysis of Lanza, 
the court in U.S. v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 1977) believed that the two 
decisions were compatible. 
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proach asks: (1) does the person have an actual expectation of 
privacy and (2) is that an expectation of privacy which society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.22 
Courts have accepted the use of electronic monitoring sys-
tems in the form of beeper tracking devices in the area of pre-
conviction police investigations.23 The beepers, as they are 
called, emit periodic signals which are picked up by radio receiv-
ers in much the same way as the NIMCOS devices operate. Pre-
conviction uses of the devices have included the attachment of 
beepers to persons, objects and automobiles for tracking by law 
enforcement agents. In such cases, the courts have conCluded 
that the use of the beepers is permissible because the persons 
being tracked have held no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their whereabouts.1l4 
Although many courts have upheld the use of such beepers, 
several courts have noted the inherent dangers of beeper tech-
nology. In United States v. Bobisink,sr. the district court stated 
that indiscriminate electronic surveillance could be a prelude to 
"1984" networks of beepers used to monitor the movements of 
ordinary citizens for the "powers that be."s8 Such indiscriminate 
surveillance, according to the Bobisink court, would intrude 
upon the reasonable expectation of privacy an individual has in 
his or her movements.27 Since the Bobisink court recognized a 
22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
23. United States v. Knotts..-U.S-, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (1983). 
In Knotts, law enforcement officers attached a beeper to he inside of a five gallon 
drum of chloroform. The officers then monitored the movement of the drum from the 
store where it was purchased to the defendant's cabin. The Supreme Court upheld the 
use of the device stating that the defendant did not hold a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle transporting the drum on public roads to the cabin. See, United 
States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub. nom., Bobisink v. United 
States, U.S. 926 (1978); and United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th CIr. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976) for other cases involving the pre-conviction uses of beeper 
devices. 
24. [d. 
25. United States v. Bobisink, 415 F.Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976), vacated and re-
manded, 562 F.2d 106 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978), reaffirmed on remand, 
469 F.Supp. 453 (1979). 
26. [d. at 1339. 
27. [d. 
Recognizing the inherent dangers of beeper devices the court stated: 
To allow such indiscriminate monitoring could conceivably be 
the prelude to sanctioning a "1984" network of such beepers 
connected to a master monitoring station which would keep 
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privacy interest in the movements" of an individual, a proba-
tioner may also have such an interest, particularly when the 
movements monitored by the NIMCOS system are within the 
context of his own home. 
The Ninth Circuit has also recognized the possibility that 
privacy interests will be limited by the use of beeper technology. 
In United States v. Curtis,28 the court stated that law enforce-
ment agencies should not have "carte blanche power to conduct 
indiscriminate surveillance" over citizens for unlimited periods 
of time. 
Since courts, despite some concern that electronic surveil-
lance invades privacy interest, have upheld such pre-conviction 
uses, it is likely that at least some applications of electronic sur-
veillance in the post-conviction context will also be upheld. 
IV. POST-CONVICTION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Katz involved the expectation of privacy an individual has 
prior to conviction.29 A probationer stands in an entirely differ-
ent position. The probationer stands convicted of a crime and 
has been sentenced after an adjudication of guilt. This section 
will discuss what, if any, expectation of privacy is retained by 
prisoners and probationers in the post-conviction context. 
The Prisoner 
Although courts have been slow to recognize prisoner rights, 
by the late 1960's courts began to scrutinize practices which de-
prived prisoners of basic human rights, including the fourth 
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
[d. 
track of each of our movements for the benefit of the powers 
that be. Certainly, the average, reasonable citizen, with the 
reasonable expectation of privacy, would take little solace in 
the fact that, while his every movement was recorded, his con-
versations were not. 
28. [d. United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir., 1977), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 910 (1978). 
29. Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
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seizures.3o In addition, a trend may be underway in which courts 
will increasingly scrutinize prison practices which infringe upon 
prisoner privacy interests relating to personal property interests 
as well as the prisoner's interests in the freedom of expression 
and association.3} Prison surveillance, however, has not been 
consistently held to as strict scrutiny as other prison practices 
have been. 
In United States v. Hearst,82 the Ninth Circuit discussed 
the constitutionality of a jail practice in which a prisoner's con-
versations with visitors were electronically taped. Although the 
court recognized that a prisoner is not deprived of all fourth 
amendment protections, the government has a weighty, counter-
vailing interest in prison security and order which permits a jail 
to infringe on prisoner privacy to promote institutional secur-
ity.38 Two rationales have traditionally been given for such in-
trusions by prison officials. These rationales include the view 
that prisons are not "protected areas" and that prisoners do not 
have an expectation of privacy while incarcerated.34 
The California Supreme Court recently recognized that 
prisoners in that state are accorded statutory privacy rights 
while incarcerated.311 In DeLancie v. Superior Court,86 a pretrial 
detainee37 sued the San Mateo County jail for injunctive and de-
claratory relief from that jail's electronic surveillance proce-
dures. The surveillance was conducted at the discretion of the 
jail administration for the alleged purpose of gathering incrimi-
nating evidence about the inmates.38 The plaintiffs alleged that 
30. Comment, Electronic Surveillance in California Prisons after DeLancie v. Su-
perior Court, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1109, 1109 (1982). 
31. Id. at 1122. 
32. 563 F.2d 1331, 1344-1345 (9th Cir. 1977). 
33. Id. at 1345-46 n.ll; See also Comment, Communications Behind Bars, 4 COM/ 
MENT 327 (1982). 
34. See supra note 30, at 1111. 
35. DeLancie v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 865, 647 P.2d 142, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866 
1982). 
36.Id. 
37. Id. Although this section discusses post-convictees, the Ninth Circuit in Hearst 
concluded that a distinction between pre-trial detainees and persons incarcerated after 
an adjudication of guilt was unnecessary because the concern in allowing jail surveillance 
is prison security, not the status of the prisoner. Hearst, 563 F.2d at 134-46 n.11. 
38. DeLancie, 31 Cal. 3d at 869-70, 647 P.2d at 146-47, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69. 
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their privacy rights under the California Constitution39 as well 
as federal constitutional rights to free speech and to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment had been violated. The plaintiffs 
also alleged that they had been subjected to a denial of equal 
protection and due process under the fourteenth amendment.4o 
The California Supreme Court, however, decided the case 
on. California Penal Code Sections 2600 and 2601 which provide 
that a person sentenced to state prison may be deprived of only 
such rights, "as ... necessary in order to provide for the reason-
able security of the institution in which he is confined and for 
the reasonable protection of the public."41The court rejected the 
argument that prisoners had no expectation of privacy and con-
cluded that the California Penal Code Sections 2600 and 2601 
evidenced a protection of prisoner rights.42 
Since the DeLancie court decided the case on statutory, 
rather than constitutional grounds, the breadth of DeLancie's 
impact on the extension of prisoner privacy rights is unclear. 
DeLancie, however, in no way prohibits all electronic surveil-
lance in the prisoner context. The court simply held that detain-
ees could obtain relief if they could show that electronic surveil-
lance in the jail did not have a justification in prison security."3 
Although both the federal and California courts have recog-
nized the government's interest in using electronic monitoring 
devices in the prison context,.· the use of such devices has not 
been analyzed in the probation context where individuals are re-
leased into the community and reside in their own homes or 
half-way houses. The following section will discuss whether pro-
bationers have reasonable expectations of privacy under tradi-
39. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I. 
40. DeLancie, 31 Cal. 3d 865, 647 P.2d 142, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866. 
41. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 2600 (West Supp. 1984). 
42. DeLancie, 31 Cal. 3d at 877, 647 P.2d at 149, 183 Cal. Rptr.at 873. 
43. See supra, note 30, at 1119. 
44. In Hearst, the Ninth Circuit stated that "once the government establishes that 
the intrusion is for the 'justifiable purpose of prison security,' the Fourth Amendment is 
essentially resolved in its favor." Hearst, 563 F.2d at 1346, quoting United States v. Daw-
son, 516 F.2d 796, 806 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975). The court noted that 
this approach reflects the federal court's" 'broad hands-off attitude toward problems of 
prison administration' and the traditional notions regarding official surveillance of pris-
oners" in relation to the reduction in the reasonable expectation of privacy held by a 
prisoner. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974). 
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tional fourth amendment analysis. 
The Probationer 
Probation is looked upon as a privilege rather than a right!6 
A judge is not required to sentence a defendant to probation in 
lieu of prison and the judge is also given broad discretion in set-
ting probation conditions in each case!6 As the Supreme Court 
stated, "The defendant stands convicted; he faces punishment 
and cannot insist on terms or strike a bargain."·7 
When probationers challenge their conditions of probation, 
they usually base their challenges on the federal constitution!8 
Irrespective of the constitutional challenges, the judicial re-
sponse has been to note that probationers have a special status 
which permits courts to impose limitations upon the constitu-
tional rights of probationers. The courts have however, required 
that such limitations upon probationer's rights be narrowly 
drawn to serve the legitimate goals of the probation system!9 
In addition, such limitations on the constitutional rights of 
probationers are often premised on a theory of waiver. The 
waiver must be reasonably related to the legitimate policies and 
objectives of the government and there must be no substitute 
measures available.60 The state, according to one commentator, 
can validly condition the receipt of the benefit of probation 
upon the waiver of the probationer's constitutional rights.61 
The courts have used a balancing test to weigh the compet-
ing interests involved in probation conditions which affect fun-
damental rights.62 The Ninth Circuit upheld probation condi-
tions which inhibited the first amendment freedom of 
45. Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modern Probation Conditions, 8 NEW 
ENG. J. PRISON L. 367, 371 (1982); See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935) for the tradi-
tional view of probation 88 an act of "grace" rather than a right. 
46. [d. 
47. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932). 
48. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 212 (1983) . 
. 49. [d. at 212-213. 
50. See supra note 45, at 372, 373. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. 
9
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association rights of a probationer in Malone v. United States."s 
The probationer in Malone was convicted of the unlawful expor-
tation of firearms to Ireland. The trial court suspended the de-
fendant's sentence and placed him on probation. The terms of 
the probation included a prohibition on participating in or be-
longing to any Irish groups or organizations. M 
Malone contested the conditions on the basis of the First 
Amendment's freedom of association clause. The Ninth Circuit, 
however, upheld the condition stating that there was a "reasona-
ble nexus" between the conditions and the goals or probation.u 
The court stated that an individual's right to freedom of associa-
tion could be reasonably restricted as part of his sentence to 
prevent future criminal conduct."e 
Particularly onerous conditions of probation led the Ninth 
Circuit, to invalidate probation conditions as being violative of 
the eight amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment in Dear Wing Jung v. United States."7 In another 
challenge to probation conditions, the Ninth Circuit held that 
conditions which required the probationer to work at a veteran's 
hospital, pay a fine of fifty dollars per month and donate a pint 
of blood to the Red Cross were constitutional."e In Springer v. 
53. Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1124 (1975). 
54. Malone, 502 F.2d at 555. 
The conditions of probation imposed upon Malone included that: 1) He obey all 
local, state and federal laws; 2) he comply with the rules and regulations of the probation 
office; 3) he not participate in any American Irish Republican movement; 4) he belong to 
no Irish organizations, cultural or otherwise; 5) he not participate in any Irish Catholic 
organizations or groups; 6) he not visit any Irish pubs; 7) he accept no employment that 
directly or indirectly associated him with any Irish organization or movement; and 8) he 
pay a fine imposed by the court. [d. 
55. [d. at 556. 
56. [d. at 556-557. 
57. Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962) 
In Dear Wing Jung, the defendant had been convicted of making false statements to 
the INS about his wife. The trial court imposed a suspended sentence upon the defen-
dant on the condition that he leave the United States. The Ninth Circuit stated that the 
government's condition would force the probationer to "choose" to leave his wife and 
children in the United States without any hope of return. Such a condition, the court 
concluded, would constitute "banishment." The court stated that such a condition con-
stituted either cruel or unusual punishment or a denial of due process which rendered 
the condition unconstitutional. [d. at 76. 
58. Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945). 
10
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United States,59 the court held that such conditions did not vio-
late the eight amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment because the conditions of probation are intended to 
be "ameliorations" of the punishment prescribed by law for the 
offense committed. 
Although probationers have been accorded some fourth 
amendment protections, the courts have permitted restrictions 
on fourth amendment rights in the probation context when such 
restrictions are necessary to achieve the goals of probation.so Al-
though an invasion of a probationer's privacy may be warranted 
by the given nature of the. probationer's underlying criminal be-
havior,sl it has been suggested that courts fairly accommodate 
the state interests in public safety, rehabilitation and deterrence 
as well as the personal liberty interests of the probationer.ss In 
formulating probation conditions, the courts should select condi-
tions designed to achieve designated penal aims, consider a vari-
ety of existing options, design conditions which are proportional 
to the underlying crime and attempt to maximize the benefits of 
the probation function. ss 
From the foregoing discussion, it would seem that although 
probationers do not possess the full panapoly of constitutional 
rights enjoyed by the average citizen, courts have protected pro-
bationer rights in certain instances. Read in conjunction with 
the prisoner rights cases, it is possible that the courts may recog-
nize that probationers retain an expectation of privacy which 
might preclude electronic surveillance when such monitoring 
fails to satisfy an articulated "security" interest or if such moni-
toring fails to rehabilitate or deter future criminal conduct.64 
The intrusiveness of the NIMCOS system on the proba-
tioner must be weighed against the alternatives awaiting that 
probationer. While the NIMCOS device allows the probation de-
partment to know when a probationer is at home, it does not 
communicate the probationer'S conversations or the conversa-
59. [d. 
60. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). 
61. [d. 
62. See supra note 45, at 391-92. 
63. [d. 
64. DeLancie, 31 Cal. 3d 865, 873 648 P.2d 142, 147, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871. 
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tions of third parties to the probation office. The NIMCOS sys-
tem does not track the probationer around town, allowing the 
probation department to know with whom the probationer visits 
or speaks to throughout the course of a day. Additionally, the 
intrusiveness of the NIMCOS must be viewed in light of the 
probationer's alternative of spending time behind bars. It can 
therefore be argued that the probationer has waived his fourth 
amendment rights in exchange for leniency. 
While the NIMCOS device may appear to be an attractive 
alternative to incarceration or other more intrusive methods of 
surveillance, the issue which should really be addressed by per-
sons engaged in the criminal justice system is whether or not 
electronic monitoring via the NIMCOS device serves legitimate 
goals of probation systems. Will such a device protect the public, 
deter future criminal conduct and serve to rehabilitate the pro-
bationer? Or will such a system be an excuse for cutbacks on 
probation services, such as psychological counseling, job train-
ing, community service and other programs? In order for condi-
tions of probation to be upheld by courts as "reasonable," apart 
from constitutional requirements, courts have also required that 
such conditions further the goals of probation, i.e., public safety 
and rehabilitation. These may be grounds for invalidating elec-
tronic monitoring systems when such devices pass constitutional 
muster. 
V. FEDERAL PROBATION GOALS AND CONDITIONS 
Probation, as an alternative to incarceration, is provided for 
in federal law under Title 18, United States Code, section 3651. 
The statute states that for offenses not punishable by death, the 
court may impose probation conditions which will best serve the 
public as well as the interests of the defendant. SII The purposes 
of this act include the protection of the public safety as well as 
the rehabilitation of the individual defendant.ss 
Although the trial court has wide discretion over the impo-
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1979). 
66. United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 
923 (1978). . 
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sition of probation conditions,67 the conditions must reasonably 
aid the purposes of public safety and rehabilitation.6s Probation-
ers, as previously pointed out, do not possess the full panapoly 
of constitutional rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens.69 Therefore, 
the courts may impose conditions on probationers which would 
be considered violations of constitutional rights if applied to 
non-convicted citizens. 
The Ninth Circuit has upheld probation conditions which 
infringe on the privacy of probationers when such conditions 
carry out the dual purposes of rehabilitating the defendant and 
protecting the public.70 
The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to uphold a search con-
dition imposed on a probationer because the condition was too 
broad. It allowed law enforcement officers to conduct searches of 
the probationer and her property around the clock. Such a con-
dition was found to be unreasonable.71 In United States v. Con-
suelo-Gonzales, the court stated, "[t]hat when fundamental 
rights are curbed [by probation conditions, they] must be done 
sensitively and with a keen appreciation that the infringement 
must serve the broad purposes of the Probation Act."72 The 
court was unable to find any justification for such a gross in-
fringement on the probationer's privacy because the condition 
was totally unrelated to her conviction for heroin possession and 
that such searches would not contribute to the probationer's re-
67. United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1978); United states v. Arhtur, 
602 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1979). 
68. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975); United States 
v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735. 
69. [d. 
70. Pierce, 561 F.2d at 739-740. 
The defendant in Pierce pled guilty to a federal tax evasion charge. Although the 
petitioner in Pierce argued that compulsion to reveal such information would result in 
self-incrimination, the court held that the condition was valid because it carried out the 
dual purposes of rehabilitating the defendant and protected the public. [d. at 738. 
71. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d at 262-263. 
72. [d. at 265; See also United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452, 453 (9th cir. 1976), in 
which the Ninth Circuit upheld a probation condition which required the probationer to 
submit to warrantless searches of his home, person or vehicle at any hour of the day or 
night by law enforcement officers. Gordon was convicted of carrying firearms as a felon 
as well as possession of a controlled substance. The court held that the search condition 
reasonably contributed to both the rehabilitation of the convict and to the protection of 
the public. The court, citing Consuelo-Gonzales, stated that Gordon's's probation condi-
tion was reasonable under the fourth amendment. [d. 
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habilitation. The court concluded, "A probationer ... has the 
right to enjoy a significant degree of privacy. "78 . 
Electronic monitoring of probationers may be too high a 
price to pay for probation. Electronic surveillance in its most in-
trusive sense has been likened to the "general searches" which 
were at the root of fourth amendment protections.74 While the 
NIMCOS device which is presently in existence may not appear 
to constitute a great intrusion into the personal privacy of the 
probationer, it does not appear that the NIMCOS device pro-
motes the federal probation goals of rehabilitation and public 
safety. In its present application to drunk drivers and white col-
lar criminals, the device may encourage the probationer to re-
main at home, but in and of itself, the device does nothing to 
prohibit the drunk driver from drinking or driving. Nor does the 
device necessarily restrain the misdeeds of white collar criminals 
who may continue their illegal business at home with the help of 
their personal computers. 
Standing alone, the NIMCOS system does not promote pub-
lic safety or rehabilitation. The device, may, however, achieve 
federal probation goals when used in conjunction with narrowly 
tailored goals and objectives directed at a particular probationer. 
In the absence of such additional conditions, the device should 
not be used exclusively as a cost-saving measure to support cuts 
in programs geared toward rehabilitative and public safety goals. 
VI. STATE PROBATION GOALS AND CONDITIONS 
Search conditions have been imposed on probationers and 
upheld as valid by courts in New Mexico711 and California.76 The 
search conditions which have been imposed by the state courts 
have included searches by law enforcement officers as well as by 
probation officers.77 
73. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d at 265; see also Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
482 (1972). 
74. Comment, Electronic General Searches, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 993, 1000 
(1982). 
75. State v. Garner, 95 N.M. 171, 619 P.2d 847 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). 
76. People v. Knox, 95 Cal. App. 3d 420, 157 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1979). 
77. People v. Natale, 77 Cal. App. 3d 568, 143 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1978). (This case 
involved a search by an officer with the permission of a parole officer.) 
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Some authorities raise serious doubts about the constitu-
tionality of wide-scale searches performed as a condition of pro-
bation. Neil P. Cohen and James J. Gobert state that search 
conditions diminish the probationer's privacy as well as the pri-
vacy of third parties present during a search of the family home 
or automobile.78 One advantage of the NIMCOS system is that it 
would limit its surveillance to the probationer and not intrude 
upon third persons. 
Although there are few statutes authorizing search condi-
tions within states, in many instances, courts do require that 
such conditions promote goals of rehabilitation, deterrence and 
public safety as is the case in the federal system.79 
Since the goals of state probation systems are very similar 
to those employed by the federal system, the same considera-
tions of the NIMCOS system are applicable to a state lawanaly-
sis. Unless the system is accompanied by additional conditions 
which promote public safety and rehabilitation, the NIMCOS-
type electronic monitoring system may be invalid as a condition 
of probation within the states. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
At a time when federal and state prisons and jails are facing 
severe problems with overcrowding and decreased funding, alter-
natives to incarceration should be considered. Knee-jerk re-
sponses which are not responsive to the promotion of public 
safety, deterrence or rehabilitation of probationers should not be 
automatically implemented just because they are economically 
feasible. 
78. COHEN & GOBERT supra note 48, at 225; State v. Gardner, 95 N.M. 171,619 P.2d 
847 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). 
79. The court in In re Martinez, 86 Cal. App. 3d 577, 150 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978), on 
the other other hand, came to a different conclusion when presented with a probation 
search condition. The court refused to uphold a general search condition because the 
search of the probationer's person or possessions would not, unlike the situations involv-
ing convictions for drug possession, further the goals of probation. Id. 
The New Mexico appeals court upheld a search condition imposed on a person con-
victed of drug possession. In State v. Gardner, the court concluded that a search condi-
tion was reasonably related to the underlying offense because the condition was aimed at 
deterring or discovering subsequent narcotics use or possession by the defendant. 95 
N.M. 171,619 P.2d 847 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). 
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The NIMCOS-type monitoring system deserves closer scru-
tiny by the criminal justice system before widespread applica-
tion. Such a system, which could result in more far reaching and 
more intrusive surveillance methods, should not be viewed as a 
cure-all solution for prison over-crowding. Courts, practitioners 
and probation officials should also ask whether or not such a de-
vice and its technology should be allowed to further erode tradi-
tional notions of privacy under the fourth amendment. Courts 
and practitioners should also concern themselves with the pos-
sibilities for abuse which make such surveillance devices a step 
toward 1984 networks which could operate to deprive not only 
probationers of their privacy, but may also work to deny ordi-
nary citizens of their right to be free from unreasonable govern-
ment intrusions into their private lives. 
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